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The Hizb al-Naṣr, or. Litany of Victory, was composed approximately years ago by the great Shaykh Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī (//). Hizb Al--Nasr - Free download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read online for free. This is the famous Hizb Al-Nasr of Imam Shazuli (ra). It is available at. osakeya.info - Download as PDF File .pdf) or read online.

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Selected Supplications (Hizb al-Nasr of Haddad and Hizb al-Nasr of Shadhili). by Smirna Si. Topics islam. Collectionopensource. Language. (pdf) Hizb al-Bahr by Sayyidi al-Imam Abul Hasan al-Shadhili a more >> Al- Yaqutiyya (pdf) Hizb al-Nasr Hizb al-Bahr - The Litany of the Sea by Sayyidi Abul. Hizb al-Nasr - حزب النصر - The Lintany of Victory. By al-Mudir June 10, June 15, Shahdili . Damas Cultural Society. Print Friendly, PDF & Email.

Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan Persian: Like most contemporary major political parties in Afghanistan, Hezb-e Wahdat is rooted in the turbulent period of the anti-Soviet resistance movements in Afghanistan in the s. It was formed to bring together nine separate and mostly inimical military and ideological groups into a single entity. During the period of the Afghan civil war in the early s, it emerged as one of the major actors in Kabul and some other parts of the country. Political Islamism was the ideology of most of its key leaders but the party gradually tilted towards its Hazara ethnic support base and became the key vehicle of the community's political demands and aspirations. Its ideological background and ethnic support base has continuously shaped its character and political agenda. Through the anti-Soviet jihad and the civil war, Hezb-e Wahdat accumulated significant political capital among Afghanistan's Hazaras. By , however, Hezb-e Wahdat was so fragmented and divided that the political weight it carried in the country bore little resemblance to what it had once been. It had fragmented into at least four competing organizations, each claiming ownership of the name and legacy of Hezb-e Wahdat. Following the collapse of the pro-Soviet Kabul government in the Hazarajat in , the region fell under the control of Shuray-e Ittefaq , a hastily assembled region-wide organization [2] [3] Soon it was challenged and overthrown by several new radical Islamist groups that engaged in endless power and ideological struggles that engulfed the region for most of the s.

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In a way the formation of the party was the culmination of a process of Islamisation of the Hazara anti-Soviet resistance groups in Afghanistan. The process was accompanied by the gradual rise to dominance of the clergy in the political leadership of the region, and in fact it marked the final victory of the clerical Islamists. By unifying under the new name they further consolidated their political dominance.

The Wahdat manifesto emphasized the continuation and intensification of efforts for the creation of an Islamic government based on the Quran and Sunnah.

It called for further efforts to incorporate all other genuine Shiite groups into the party and to act in solidarity with all Islamic organizations of the Sunnis. The language of the manifesto clearly indicates that Wahdat was to be, at least predominately, a Shiite organization, despite references to solidarity and cooperation with the Sunni organizations.

It demanded an equal status for Shiite jurisprudence alongside the Hanafi school, dominant among Sunnis in the country. As a religious party, Hezb-e Wahdat can be credited with an openness and inclusiveness exceptional in a conservative society like Afghanistan. In an exceptional move among the Afghan mujahedin, the party included ten women members in its central council and had devoted an entire committee for women's affairs that was headed by a university-educated Hazara woman.

Selected Supplications (Hizb al-Nasr of Haddad and Hizb al-Nasr of Shadhili)

The main point, however, is that the movement gradually tilted towards its ethnic support base. Subsequent political developments in Kabul exposed the difficulties of establishing an Islamic government in the country.

With the fall of the communist regime in Kabul and the failure to form an Islamic government, the warring factions turned to their ethnic and regional support bases. While Islamism remained the officially proclaimed ideology of most groups, ethnic demands and power struggles surfaced as major sources of political mobilization.

Wahdat's leaders were endeavoring to strike a balance between ethnicity and religion. The result was an Islamic ideology used to express and further the rights of a historically disadvantaged community; a strong desire for unity of the Hazaras was its main driving force. In fact, ideologically, Nasr's trademark combination of ethnic nationalism and radical Islamism increasingly became the ideology of Wahdat, an ethnic discourse dominated by, and expressed through, an Islamic language.

Abdul Ali Mazari , a former member of Nasr and first secretary general of Wahdat, was the main agent of the explicit transformation of the party into a platform for the rights and political demands of the Hazaras. When he arrived in Kabul in , he further opened the door of the party to Hazaras of all social and ideological backgrounds.

A group of former leftists and government bureaucrats joined the inner circle of the party leadership, generating further rifts. This was a real test of political tolerance of the more conservative section of the clergy. While the party was created to unify the predominantly Islamist and clerical organizations, in Kabul it confronted groups of educated Hazaras much larger than had been the case in the provinces; these were also mostly leftist and relatively well organized.

The question of whether the party should accept these individuals divided the party leadership. The ulema Scholars needed the knowledge and experiences of these educated Hazaras to help the party adjust to an urban political setting. The party suffered from a chronic shortage of members who had benefited from a modern education. Furthermore, most of the clerics had little familiarity with the politics of Kabul. Most of them were educated in religious centers in Iran and Iraq and had mainly engaged in politics in rural Hazarajat.

Finally, Wahdat fighters lacked military skills suitable to an urban environment. Despite that, many key figures in the central council opposed the inclusion of the educated Kabulis in the party, viewing them as godless communists. While none of the former leftists were given any position of authority within the party leadership, their strengthening relationship with, and perceived influence on, Abdul Ali Mazari angered the more conservative sections of the party.

On the other hand, the leftists did not seek any official positions within the party ranks. They were mostly concerned with ensuring their personal security and avoiding persecution by the mujahedin.

The idea of building an Islamic government and promoting religious fraternity rapidly ran into difficulties. Hezb-e Wahdat's stance as the representative of the Hazara mujahedin was not welcomed by its Sunni counterparts in Peshawar. Instead, it was effectively excluded from the negotiations around the formation of a mujahedin government in Kabul, which were dominated by the Sunnis.

A Hezb-e Wahdat delegation to Peshawar, sent to negotiate a possible inclusion in the process, returned to Bamyan badly disappointed. In a central council meeting in Bamyan, the delegation headed by Abdul Ali Mazari raised the issue of deliberating a new political strategy.

Some of the Sunni fundamentalist parties had basically ignored the Shiite claims of any form of effective representation in a future government. In opposition to Hezb-e Wahdat's demand of a quarter share in future power-sharing arrangements, some of the Sunni parties stated that the Shiites did not count as a significant community, deserving to be included in the negotiation process.

Three days of deliberations in the party's central council in Bamyan produced a new strategy: This new strategy was to be pursued with the military commanders of various communities in the provinces rather than with the leaders in Peshawar. Government officials of various ethnic communities were also contacted to join or support the new alliance.

The new strategy was communicated with various political and military players in the country through delegations and representatives. Fifty delegations were dispatched to several parts of the country, including the Panjshir valley and the northern province of Balkh. Members of the delegations were tasked with exploring a common political strategy for collectively bargaining over the rights of minorities in future political arrangements.

Massoud was chosen as head of the new council, Mohammad Mohaqiq from Hezb-e Wahdat as his deputy and General Dostum as commander of its military affairs. Similarly, the political arrangements among the Sunni mujahedin organisations also fell apart, turning the city into a battleground for the most devastating and atrocious conflicts.

Wahdat became an important part of the conflict for nearly three years. This provoked intense internal debates within the party. The questions of external alignments further inflamed the internal tensions. Muhammad Akbari rose as leader of a pro-Massoud camp within the party, challenging the wisdom of Abdul Ali Mazari's refusal to join Burhanuddin Rabbani's and Massoud's government and his participation in an alliance with Hekmatyar , the leader of Hezb-e Islami , who had emerged as the main opposition.

The differences between Abdul Ali Mazari and Akbari resulted in the first major split within the party. After the split, both leaders maintained separate political and military organisations under the name of Wahdat, with Abdul Ali Mazari maintaining the main body of the party. The growing rivalries and tensions between the two leaders surfaced strongly in the preparations for the party's leadership election in September The election was held amid a heightened competition between the two contending figures for leadership of the party.

The party was experiencing its most difficult internal power struggle since it had been formed. New political fault lines were emerging as the party leaders tried to define and articulate their political agendas in Kabul. Both sides were determined to win in order to dominate leadership positions and consequently change the political direction of the party.

The venue for the forthcoming elections also proved to be contentious. Akbari was pressing for the elections to be held in Bamyan where he felt stronger.

By contrast, Mazari and his supporters pushed for elections in Kabul where he had cultivated a larger support base among urbanised Hazaras. Given the political differences and personal rivalries between the two leaders, the first election of the secretary general of the party was hotly contested. It was also particularly sensitive given the context of the civil war in Kabul, with regards to which both figures were proposing different political directions for the party.

Akbari hoped he could alter the role of the party in the war and in the conflict in Kabul in favour of Rabbani's government through his election as secretary general of the party. Consequently, the election of secretary general gained a paramount importance for both sides in the civil war to maintain or change the political alignments of the party in their favour.

The elections were held amid a climate of distrust and violence. By gaining 43 votes out of 82 members of the central council present , Abdul Ali Mazari was re-elected as leader. Akbari with 33 votes was elected as his first deputy. Similarly, agreements were reached on 20 other key appointments. Akbari's faction won the positions of heads of cultural and military committees, which they had strongly pressed for.

He and his supporters believed that by dominating the cultural and military committees they could manipulate the war and propaganda machine of the party in favour of the Rabbani government, their external ally. Karim Khalili, who would later become the leader of the party, was elected as chief of its political affairs committee. The voting patterns during the elections offer important insights into the internal politics of the party. Members of Nasr and Pasdaran, the two largest and most powerful numerically and politically, dominated the process as well as the two emergent factions.

While Nasr maintained its cohesiveness, most other smaller organisations were divided. All former members of Nasr in the council voted for Mazari, testifying to the lasting cohesiveness of Nasr as a political block within Wahdat. By contrast, while most former members of Pasdaran supported Akbari, some of them cast their votes for Mazari.

Other organisations such as Shuray-e Ittefaq and Jabh-e Motahid were bitterly divided. Moreover, distrust and suspicions continued to undermine the new appointments.

The role of external players, particularly that of Rabbani's government, was crucial. It is believed that the Rabbani government had been working through their contacts with Akbari to undermine Mazari and turn Hezb-e Wahdat into an ally. Mazari strongly suspected Akbari of trying to undermine him. A few weeks after the party elections, in response to an alleged coup plan by Akbari and sections of Harakat Islami against him, Mazari ordered his troops to attack and expel all his opponents from the western part of the capital.

Consequently, Akbari, his supporters and his allies in Harakat were forced to flee into areas controlled by Massoud in the north of the capital. While the exact details of the alleged plot remain unknown, Mazari later claimed that Qasim Fahim, then Rabbani's head of the intelligence department, was working with Akbari to militarily force him out of leadership. According to the allegations, Massoud was funding and arming as many as 20, troops to allow Akbari to take over Wahdat's leadership in Kabul and establish its control in Hazarajat as well.

The split opened a deep and long standing political division among the Hazaras of Afghanistan. While Mazari and his successor Khalili commanded the support of most of the Hazaras, Akbari mostly operated in opposition to them.

Following the death of Mazari at the hands of the Taliban in March , Karim Khalili was elected as the new party leader. In contrast, Akbari joined the Taliban when they took control of Bamyan in September In its history, the party suffered three major defeats.

The first defeat was marked by its downfall in Kabul and the death of Mazari at the hands of the Taliban in March Secondly, in August the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif was overrun by the Taliban; the city was the second important centre of the northern alliance after the fall of Kabul and also held a major concentration of Wahdat's troops and civilian Hazaras.

Hezb-e Wahdat had played the key role in repelling a Taliban offensive on the city in and was to bear the brunt of Taliban anger this time. Thousands of Hazaras were massacred or imprisoned. Thirdly, in a few weeks the Taliban captured Bamyan, the new headquarters of the party, in another dramatic move. This marked the end of Hezb-e Wahdat's political life as a cohesive political organisation.

The fall of these two cities proved to be much more than military defeats. Nearly all of the territories under its control were captured by the Taliban. Its political and military cadres fled into neighbouring countries.

Khalili went to Iran. From amongst the senior leaders, only Muhaqiq after a brief period in Iran returned quickly to Afghanistan and organised a resistance front in the Balkhab district of Saripul. Wahdat It never managed to recover after the fall of Mazar e sharif and Bamyan into the hands of the Taliban, because of the high losses in its rank and file and at the leadership levels.

Thus Hezb-e Wahdat participated in the post-Taliban political process with little of its past political and military weight. Wahdat still claimed to represent the Hazaras and the Hazarajat region fell under its control as the Taliban regime was overthrown. In the Interim Administration — , Wahdat had a modest weight; Muhammad Mohaqiq represented the party as one of the deputy chairmen and Minister of Planning.

Members of Harakat and Akbari's Wahdat mostly represented the Shiites in the Interim Administration as well as the Transitional Administration in Moreover, in the new political circumstances, the party needed to adapt to the new political realities in the country.

The new political order established under the auspices of the international community required the military-political organisations to transform into civilian political parties. This entailed disbanding their military wings, disarming under the UN -led Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programme and operating under the new legal and political environment.

As mentioned earlier, Hezb-e Wahdat's military structure disintegrated under the Taliban, and as a result in late the organisation was in no way comparable to other anti-Taliban organisations in terms of military structure and hardware. Its leaders lacked the political and military resources to reorganise their fighters on any significant scale. In June the only major military structure controlled by the party, the Ninth Corps, was disbanded, ending financial support from the centre to Wahdat's military wing.

On the positive side, its leaders can claim credit for effectively having given up their military wing.

The second and most pressing demand for reform came from within the Hazara political community. Reforming and reviving the party as the largest and most influential Hazara organisation was a central priority for most of the Hazara intellectual and clerical elites. Many educated Hazaras of various ideological backgrounds rushed to Kabul in and volunteered to play a role in the party. Ideas for reform and restructuring the party were presented to Karim Khalili and Muhammad Mohaqiq, who were seen as the key leaders.

While the need to change and broaden the party leadership has frequently been acknowledged by both Mohaqiq and Khalili, most reformists including clerics have been frustrated by lack of practical will and determination of the senior leaders.

The transition from a military to political organisation has been similarly difficult for other Afghan organisations created during the years of war. Wahdat's political cadres were mostly clerics educated in religious schools in Afghanistan or in Iran and Iraq. In their rise to political leadership they fiercely competed with university-educated challengers and remained sceptical and fearful of modern educated politicians.

They suddenly found themselves forced to engage with western notions of democracy, human rights etcetera. As in , opening the doors of the party to more educated Hazara cadres was a precondition for meeting reformist expectations, but the return to the country of many young Hazaras educated in Iran and Pakistan was out of all proportion with the threat that had been represented by the limited number of leftists and government officials welcomed into Wahdat in After , the party nominally maintained its old structure in which seven of the eleven commissions within the Jaghori of the party were chaired by ulema.

Only technical and insignificant positions such as health and archaeological committees were headed by non-clerical figures.

Furthermore, the non-clerical figures were mostly acting on behalf of their senior clerical leaders. While a few of Wahdat's founders continued to exercise leadership and political power, most others were not as lucky. O He of Whom no place is empty.

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